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Abstract—This paper proposes a new distributed
monitoring approach based on the notion of centrality
of a graph and its evolution in time. We consider an
activity profiling method for a distributed monitoring
platform and illustrate its usage in two different target
deployments. The first one concerns the monitoring of
a distributed honeynet, whilst the second deployment
target is the monitoring of a large network telecope.
The central concept underlying our work are the inter-
section graphs and a centrality based locality statistics.
These graphs have not been used widely in the field
of network security. The advantage of this method is
that analyzing aggregated activity data is possible by
considering the curve of the maximum locality statistics
and that important change point moments are well
identified.
I. Introduction
The motivations of this paper are twofolds. The first
motivation of our work is related to the conceptual ap-
proaches and algorithms required to perform distributed
monitoring. If we consider a distributed monitoring plat-
form for a given target deployment (please see figure 1),
several questions must be addressed.
– Do all management agents observe the same type of
events ? If no, how can we correlate a distributed view
and aggregate the commonly observed evidence ?
– Can we discover a temporal behavior of the whole
platform ? Do some agents tend to observe the same
type of behavior during a particular time of the day,
while others remain to hold a localized and very
isolated observation behavior ?
A second motivation of our work came from a very
realistic requirements. We are part of a large honeyney
distributed over the Internet. Each individual honeypot
monitors backscatter packets and incoming attacks. When
working on the resulted datasets, we were challenged by
the lack of methods capable to compare such a distributed
platforms and to detect temporal/spatial trends in the
observed traffic patterns.
Our paper is structured as follows : In section 2, a
generic method for analyzing a distributed monitoring
platform is described. This method uses graph intersec-
tions in order to model the distributed platform and to
follow their temporal evolution. Section 3 shows how this
method can be used for monitoring a large honeynet. An
analysis concerning IP related headers is done for the two
data sources and additional results concerning differences
and analogous behavior between these two are presented.
Section 4 presents related works and finally section 5
concludes the paper.
Fig. 1. Distributed monitoring model
II. Intersection graphs
The method based on intersection graphs has been
introduced in [1] for profiling communications patterns
between the users of a high profiled enterprise.
A. Graphs and activity profiling
A graph is composed of several nodes and arcs. Two
nodes are linked if there is a relation between them. A
relation can be : similarity, difference, or communication
exchanges. The relation will be formally defined for each
deployment target in the following sections. We consider
that arcs are not directed and that the graph is an
undirected graph. The adjacency matrix of a graph is a
boolean square matrix where each line and each column
represents a node. It is defined as :
Aij = 1 if an arc between i and j exists, 0 else
where i and j are 2 vertices of the graph
Since we consider a undirected graph :
Aij = Aji(symmetrical matrix)
If we consider the figure 2, the corresponding matrix is :
A =
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
a b c d e f g
0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Fig. 2. An undirected graph
B. Central node
Generally, a central node is interesting because it has
multiple direct or indirect relations. Using the most central
node we can evaluate the centrality of the graph by
counting the number of relations (arcs). A simple method
to detect this node could be to get the node which has the
maximum number of neighbors.
For example, in figure 2 the most connected nodes
are c and e with 3 neighbors. However, if we consider
the node d, this one seems to be also well connected,
although it has only 2 neighbors. In fact, if a node has
only few relations but these relations lead to nodes that
are well connected, then the original node is interesting
and central. Therefore, we can consider not only the direct
neighbors but a subgraph of all nodes which are located in
an area defined by the distance from the evaluated node.
The centrality is the number of arcs of the subgraph.
In figure 2, considering a distance k = 2, nodes c and e
have a centrality of 4. For the node d, the associated value
is 6. Based on on this method, the central node is d.
Another way to get the central nodes is to use the
eigenvalues and eigenvectors, as proposed in [2].
C. Locality statistics
A graph can vary over the time and thus we need to
somehow capture and describe variations in the centrality.
The main idea is to consider at each time instant the
central node and the associated centrality and to analyse
the temporal behavior of these two entities. The intuition
behind is that when major graph changes occur in the
topologies of a graph, the relations between nodes change
and this will be reflected by a change in the centrality
too. Moreover, the central node which is responsible of the
maximal centrality can be detected and the appearance
or disappearance of a node implies that its relationships
increased or respectively decreased.
Consider the example of the evolution of a graph which
is described below :
– t = 1 : 10 nodes, 11 arcs
– t = 2 : node and arcs added but with isolated node
– t = 3 : increase of number of arcs
– t = 4 et 5 : 5 arcs added
– t = 6 : 5 nodes removed, about linear graph
– t = 7 : increase of nodes and arcs
– t = 8 : remove only one node which was isolated
– t = 9 : increase of nodes and arcs
– t = 10 : 5 nodes removed, non linear but scattered
graph
(a) t = 1 (b) t = 2 (c) t = 4 et t = 5
Fig. 3. Graph time series (bold line : adding, dashed line : removing)
The following formula describes formally the locality
statistics, described in the previous paragraph :
ψk(v) = number of arcs of the subgraph
of k nearest neighbors of v
Mk = max
v∈nodes
ψk(v) (1)
Figure 4 presents the result of this formula with different
values of k = 1..4. For k = 0, the value is always 0 which
is normal because in this case no neighbors are concerned
and only the current node composes the subgraph.
The values for k = 3 and k = 4 are identical and that
means that for k less than 3 it’s possible to find a node
having the associated subgraph of neighbors covering the
total graph. This observation shows that the choice of k
is important. k must not be too small because important
information might not be revealed. If k is to large, all the
graph is covered. In our case, the value of k = 2 seems to
be a good choice.
In the figure 4, the plot for k = 2 increases up to 5
because the graph has more and more nodes and arcs. We
can also observe that due to the linearity of the graph, the
locality statistics decreases. The locality statistics allowed
to observe this evolution. Large values of this statistics
are to be associated with major changes in the inter-node
relationships.
It is also important to observe the responsible nodes
associated to the peaks of the locality statistics (maximum
centrality). In the previous example, node c is always
central.
Fig. 4. Locality statistics according to time
The major goal is not only to show the evolution of
the topology of the graph but in fact to discover new
nodes that might become important. For instance, for time
instants 3 and 4, node c is the only central node. This
centrality is equal to 12 and respectively 15. The same
analysis for the node g shows that its values goes from
6 to 12. In all cases, its centrality is lower that the one
of c, but the evolution of g is more interesting. This type
of behavior can be put into evidence by a standardized
locality statistics :
ψ̃k,t(v) =
(ψk,t(v) − µ̂k,t,τ (v))
max(σ̂k,t,τ (v), 1)
µ̂k,t,τ (v) =
1
τ
∗
t−1∑
t′=t−τ
ψk,t′(v)
σ̂k,t,τ (v) =
1
τ − 1
t−1∑
t′=t−τ
(ψk,t′(v) − µ̂k,t,τ (v))
2
M̃k,t = max
v∈nodes
ψ̃k,t(v) (2)
In fact, in the formula 2, the centrality is standardized
with respect to previous values of a sliding window. The
size of the window is τ . Nodes which tend to remain
constant will have a low value. In figure 5, the interesting
plot for k = 2 shows that for example between time
instants 4 and 5 when the graph does not change, the
associated value decreases quickly. This is due to the low
value of τ = 5.
When central nodes are extracted, node g becomes the
only central node at time 4, showing that node c was
only central at the beginning. Thus, the importance of
c is lowered over time and a new node g can become an
important node.
D. From graphs to network monitoring
If we consider a distributed monitoring platform, we can
use a graph model to represent the relationships among
the monitoring agents. Each agent is represented by a
Fig. 5. Locality statistics according to time
node in the graph. A relationship between two agents is
given by the similarity in the observed data and is thus
domain specific. The major idea however is to consider
an arc between two nodes, if and only if the associated
agents have observed a common activity. To illustrate this
idea, if we consider different honeypots of a honeynet and
each honeypot monitors commonly used parameters like
source IP addresses, source ports, destination ports, an arc
between two nodes exists if both agents have a significant
overlap in the observed parameters.
III. Honeynet and intersection graphs
A. Honeypot and honeynet
A honeypot is described in [3] as an environment where
vulnerabilities are deliberately introduced. Malicious in-
truders are lured into attacking such a system and pro-
viding useful information to security officers and resear-
chers. Such information typically includes details about
the source of the attack, temporal patterns in this activity
and the tools used during and after an attack.
However, only one honeypot is not sufficient for a sound
analysis at a Internet scale level. Several honeypots can be
grouped into a network which is called an honeynet. In this
case, all honeypot share their informations with others and
they are dispersed over all the Internet.
For our work, the honeynet of the Leurre.com project
was used. This network consists of 129 individual systems
run by 43 honeypots. Each individual honeypot uses 3
distinct IP addresses and emulates 3 different operating
systems (one operating system per address : Windows NT
server, Windows 98, and Linux Red Hat 7.3). Data is
collected locally and centralized in a database.
The period of our study covers the data from May to
December 2004 and includes more than 11 millions IP
packets. The period is sliced into weeks. The table I gives
the exact details about the analyzed data.
Honeypot
#monitored addresses 129
Number of in-
coming packets
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
475 519
1 211 820
1 495 525
1 821 534
1 371 280
2 317 525
2 292 083
1 451 770
Number of
unique source
IP addresses
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
18 392
39 419
34 011
49 076
60 666
77 032
84 485
82 500
Size of data
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
69 MB
176 MB
217 MB
264 MB
199 MB
337 MB
333 MB
211 MB
TABLE I
Global information about the honeynet data. The months
are represented in number (05, 06, 07...)
B. Applications
1) Source IP addresses: The goal of our first analysis
was to analyse the distributed views of the honeypots with
respect to the source IP addresses and identify the ones
that stand out of the crowd, ie that capture suspect source
addresses that are not captured by other honeypots.
Nodes represent the different honeypot platforms. For
each nodes, the sets with captured source addresses are
compared. Two nodes are linked only if the intersection
between the corresponding sets represents less than a
threshold of the union of addresses. If nodes were really
distinct, there would be more and more arcs and the
locality statistic would increase. The normalized locality
statistic permits to detect where and when the topology
changes significantly and to detect the honeypots which
are responsible for the new maximal locality. These central
honeypots could be considered as interesting because they
detects particular source IP addresses
Figure 7 shows the plots of the simple locality statistics,
using several threshold percentages. For small thresholds,
the plots tend to overlap, a good setting of this value is
0.25%, where only few points are not overlapped.
On the average, there are one or more nodes having
high centrality values, because these nodes are linked to
all other nodes. The figure 6 shows the number of this
type of nodes as well as the respective honeypot. The first
value is less important because in this case all nodes are
isolated. The number of honeypots that are significantly
different (0.25%) decreases too. The figure 7 represents
the standardized locality with τ = 5 weeks. Using the
method of the intersection graph, we can observe that
when the value of the maximum standardized locality
statistics is low, the topology of the graph is constant,
while high values indicate major topology changes. The
plots are generally overlapping and there are 8 peaks.
The concerning central nodes have been extracted and
some nodes (6) appear several time. Therefore, the 6
honeypots corresponding to these nodes are very different
with respect to the remaining ones.
Fig. 6. Number of central nodes for the honeynet
Fig. 7. Honeynet source IP addresses analysis - Standardized locality
with τ = 5 (shared addresses ≤ 0.25%)
2) Source ports: A second goal was to detect honeypots
which observe port source addresses that other honeypots
have not observed. Only packets with both flags SYN and
ACK were considered. This kind of packets are in fact
backscatter packets. In this particular case, the perceived
source ports are in fact ports which have been attacked
with IP spoofed packets. Thus, this study is relevant to
attacked ports.
A node in the graph is a honeypot platform and similar
to the previous case, an arc links 2 nodes if the set
intersection of their source ports is lower than a threshold
of the union of the source ports. Therefore, if honeynets
were different, the locality statistic of these nodes would
increase and the plots of the maximal locality statistic
would show it. The plots corresponding to the unnorma-
lized maximal locality statistic are represented in figure 8
(for a threshold of 10%) and respectively in figure 9 for
a threshold of 25%. A threshold of 25% implies that the
number of arcs is higher and the different plots are not
overlapping. However, the aim of our work was to detect
platforms that are different and a 25% threshold means
that we consider 2 honeypots different even if they share
one quarter of their source ports. If we consider both
thresholds 10% and 25% we observe that the peaks in
both plots are located at the same time instants and such
the threshold of 10% is sufficient for detecting topology
changes. The plots of the maximal centralized locality
statistic with a sliding window size of 5 look like the
figure 8 and 9.
Fig. 8. Honeynet source ports analysis - locality statistic (shared
ports ≤ 10%)
Fig. 9. Honeynet source ports analysis - locality statistic (shared
ports ≤ 25%)
If we consider now the plots for a threshold of 10%,
at many time instants the number of arcs is 0. In these
cases the honeypots share more than 10% of the detected
attacked ports. The ports are coded with 2 bytes in the
TCP header and so 216 ports are theoretically possible.
However only few ports out of this large pool are really
used and correspond to known deployed services.
Although several peaks are visible, the maximum lo-
cality is not very high and it’s probably due to the low
quantity of data at the honeynet. For instance,if the ports
detected would be completely different between the 43
honeypots, the number of arcs would be :
∑
1
i=43−1 i = 946.
3) Attack tools: A TCP session is established thanks
to the 3-way handshake. First the initiator sends a packet
with flag SYN and a random sequence number (also called
Initial Sequence Number -ISN). The correspondent ack-
nowledges the packets with an acknowledgment number
equal to the previous sequence number + 1. Finally the
initiator acknowledges this reply. Some attack tools use
always the same sequence number or do not use a good
(high entropy) random number generator. Consequently,
the acknowledgment numbers are either always the same,
or depend on the use of a specific exploit code. We
looked if the same attack tool was used to attack different
computers and for this work we considered also the the
backscatter packets (replies of attacks).
In this case, the construction of the graphs consists in
considering nodes as honeypots and two nodes will be
linked if they share more than a threshold of the union
of their observed acknowledgment numbers. Using a thre-
shold of 90% the plots are given in figure 10. In general the
acknowledgment numbers are different between platforms
because the number of arcs is low. This is due to the
diversification of the attack tools.
Fig. 10. Honeynet acknowledgment numbers analysis - locality
statistic (shared acknowledgment numbers ≥ 90%)
Two peaks are clearly visible and in these case the plots
are overlapping. This shows the presence of one or central
honeypot linked with all others. Using the standardized
locality statistic with a sliding window size of 5, the
obtained plots are similar because the standardization is
made thanks to previous values, which are mostly equal
to 0. The figure 11 presents the graphs of weeks 41 and
52 corresponding to the peaks. In the figure 11(a), many
nodes are linked with many others. A lot of honeypots
have detected about the same acknowledgment numbers
(threshold ≥ 90%) and the use of the same attack tools
is undeniable. However for the second peak in week 52,
(shown in the figure 11(b)) the picture is totally different
and only some honeypots are concerned. In this case, this
is probably due to a same attack tool with a bad random
numbers generator which implies that the same generated
number is used several times and detected by different
honeypots.
(a) week 41 (b) week 52
Fig. 11. Intersection graphs for acknowledgment numbers shown by
the honeynet
IV. Related works
The honeypots and honeynets are presented in [3] where
general definitions and platform description are are given.
That reference containts also results about the localization
of the attacks or the observation of worm spreading in the
context of the Leurre.com project.
In [4], the same authors propose a more elaborated
method to study the data of the honeynet. In fact, the
authors clusterize the different captured network packets
using the Levenshtein distance in order to group packets
which are due to the same attack.
In [5], the goal of the paper is to determine the degree of
the interaction of a honeypot needed to collect useful data,
while in the same time avoiding to collect too much useless
data. Even if it seems that a low level interaction honeypot
is sufficient, the use of a high level of interaction degree is
needed to correctly configure the low level interaction.
The reference book in system administration [9] includes
several examples on the use of graphs and the centrality
of a node by using eigen vectors. The first work applying
these techniques to security monitoring is [1], where the
email exchanges in the enron database is analyzed in order
to prove that that some employees had inside level infor-
mation on the fraudulos management. The same method
was applied to network security in [10] for end user level
activity profiling. The goal was to detect if the websites
visited by employes can be associated to a normal type of
behavior and how malware spreading can be detected if
anormal activity is observed.
V. Conclusions
In the work presented in this paper we were challenged
by several research questions. Firstly, we needed a generic
method to analyze large scale honeynet data.
The central concept underlying our work are the inter-
section graphs. These graphs have not been used widely
in the field of network security. The advantage of this
method is that analyzing aggregated data is possible by
considering the curve of the maximum locality statistic
and the maximum standardized locality statistics. This is
possible because these plots are closely related to the trend
of the variation in the topology of a graph. This method
allows also to identify the nodes, which are important in
the graph. Importance can be assimilated with monitoring
agents that observe unusual network activities.
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